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Has the Accounting Profession Lost Control of Its Destiny? 
D. R. Carmichael* 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
No man of woman born, coward or 
brave can shun his destiny. 
— H o m e r 
W h e n H o w a r d Stettler asked me to write about whether the accounting 
profession has lost control of its destiny I accepted because I was interested i n 
the answer. L i k e many others who are essentially in the business of putting 
words on paper, I don't know what I believe until I write it. However, the 
answer proved more elusive than I anticipated. 
In a sense, no man controls his destiny. In this sense, the question is loaded 
because the idea of a destiny presumes predetermination. According to Webster's, 
destiny means either something to which a person or thing is destined or a 
predetermined course of events often held to be a resistless power or agency. 
Synonyms are fortune and fate. However, I think the question contemplates a 
related word—destination. The relevant questions are: Where are we going 
and who's in charge of the trip? 
H o w D o We K n o w Where We're Going? 
A logical starting point would seem to be a prediction of where the ac-
counting profession is headed. However, man has not been too successful i n 
predicting. Most predictions are merely extrapolations of present trends. W e 
cannot know what future accidents, catastrophes, or personalities may alter those 
trends. A s a result, predictions often tell us more about the present than the 
future. For example, consider these predictions from the year 1876.1 
• Poor penmanship and writer's cramp no longer impede personal cor-
respondence thanks to the advent of the home linotype. 
• Malodorous footwear w i l l never again upset social gatherings or com-
munity affairs as gentlemen of the next century sport pasteurized 
spats and gaiters. 
• Gone are the days of the "Three R's . " Boys and girls of the future 
must now be drilled i n the "Five R's"—Reading, Wr i t ing , Trans-
*The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Brian Zell of the AICPA staff and 
to point out that the opinions expressed are the author's views and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of the AICPA or other members of its staff. 
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mitting, Receiving, and Arithmetic—as Morse's code replaces the 
alphabet. 
• Housewives and domestics are no longer confronted with the every-
day dangers of flying porcelain shards and glass splinters as beautiful 
and unbreakable vulcanized dishes grace the finest tables. 
• The w i n d may blow and the hail may fall, but Americans of the future 
are comfortable and secure i n their prefabricated, mailorder, cast iron 
outbuildings. 
Predictors of 1899 were no more successful.2 This is how they expected events 
to unfold. 
1923—Steam powered Victrolas bring culture to a l l ! 
1963—100 mile-an-hour express trains whisk passengers from coast to 
coast i n complete comfort! 
1975—Price of next day mail service from N e w Y o r k to Washington 
reduced to ½¢! 
One could go on and on citing predictions of future developments, such as 
the bank-by-wireless craze of the Twenties, that have somehow gone awry. So, 
rather than trying to predict the destination of the accounting profession, I w i l l 
try to identify the trends that seem to be guiding the accounting profession in 
a particular direction. 
The Accounting Profession i n the Age of Consumerism 
N o t long ago accountants were looked on with derision, if at al l . The 
Hol lywood image of accountants was typified by the likes of Frankl in Pangborn 
and A r n o l d Stang. Accountants were the butt of several jokes. 3 Efforts to raise 
the public's awareness of accountants were largely unsuccessful. W h o can 
remember that W o r l d W a r II slogan, "Pencils for Peace"? 
Those days are gone. Accountants have been thrust into the public lime-
light. Hardly a month goes by that a major newspaper or magazine does not 
mention accountants. The accounting profession is under the scrutiny of both 
houses of Congress and the Federal Trade Commission. In colleges and univer-
sities across the country, eager students in record numbers have been signing 
up for accounting courses, wi th the apparent approval of their parents. What is 
it about accounting that caused this boom i n popularity? In a word, accounting 
acquired "glamour." 
Glamour has its price, however. The increase in public awareness of in-
dependent auditors (as one segment of accounting) has sometimes caused em-
barrassment and has brought independent auditors in contact with the forces 
of consumerism. 
Consumerism, of course, is not a new phenomenon. One author notes, 
"For centuries religious and social philosophers classified the businessman as a 
quasi c r imina l . " 4 However, recently the cause of consumerism has been trans-
lated into legislative proposals, such as the recently defeated proposal for a 
Consumer Protection Agency, which have been scarce since the N e w Deal legis-
lation of the 1930's. 
Consumerism w i l l have its ups and downs, but the movement w i l l have 
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a long-term effect on all institutions i n our society. N o w that public attention is 
focused on the social function that independent auditors perform, the accounting 
profession is bound to be affected by current social trends. 
The Tortuous Fruits of Consumerism 
Consumerism has had a profound influence on the courts. The current 
theory of torts seems to be that when someone is injured, someone else is to 
blame. The associated factor of "bad l u c k " is not defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary; however, one author has observed: 
T w o attitudes characteristic of our affluent society have exerted increas-
ing pressure upon tort and compensation law. The first is intolerance 
of bad luck, to the extent that its victims are thought not only to need 
but to deserve compensation. The second is a belief that where the 
technology to prevent accidents or cure or prevent disease exists, it 
should be used. 5 
The clearest indication of this trend is i n the area of product liability. N o t 
long ago, product liability was based on concepts of warranties and negligence, 
and the rules for determining breach of warranty or negligence were relatively 
specific. Sometimes, however, the burden of meeting those specific tests pre-
vented injured parties from collecting damages. Some courts found this offensive 
to social justice. They felt injured parties could and should be compensated by 
the market place, and the concept of strict liability has gained considerable favor. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines strict liability as— 
Liability without fault. Case is one of "strict l iabil i ty" when neither 
care nor negligence, neither good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor 
ignorance w i l l save the defendant. 
Cost spreading is the theory behind strict liability. Manufacturers w i l l be 
liable for damages caused by their products; the burden of damages can be 
spread among manufacturers by insurance; and the cost, i n turn, can be passed 
on to consumers i n general through higher prices. For example, this theory was 
applied to the auditor's liability i n the Rusch Factors case: 
W h y should an innocent party be forced to carry the weighty burden 
of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more 
easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting 
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against risk on to its 
customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming 
publ ic? 6 
However, the theory of product liability is a questionable analogy for the 
practice of independent auditing. Product liability has generally applied to sales 
of goods resulting i n physical harm. Public accounting involves the sale of a 
professional service that rarely has resulted i n physical harm. Nevertheless, this 
distinction has not been impenetrable to those bent on recovering damages. 
The distinctions between the sale of a good and the sale of a service, be-
tween a professional service and a nonprofessional service, between physical 
harm and economic harm are not discrete, and, if these subjective boundaries 
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seem to lead to inequities, the courts may disregard them. For example, the 
distinction between goods and services has been challenged as follows: 
Certainly there is no triumph of logic i n the present state of the law 
under which a patient injured by a defective instrument used i n surgery 
performed on h i m may be unable to employ strict liability, while a 
person purchasing an article at the hospital gift shop is able to hold the 
hospital strictly liable. 7 
The physical harm test has been disregarded in several cases, most notably Union 
Oil Co. v. Oppen, which involved fishermen's claims for lost profits arising 
from a negligent o i l spil l . The court substituted a test of "reasonable foreseeabil-
i ty " for determining compensation for economic losses.8 
Negligence is No Excuse 
The Hochfelder decision put a damper on some of the more adventurous 
interpretations of the auditor's liability under the SEC's Rule 10b-5; for example, 
the highly subjective "flexible standard" applied i n White v. Abrams. Some 
saw the Hochfelder decision as affirming the traditional common law principles 
of f raud. 9 But others have seen Hochfelder as taking away the right of investors 
to recovery, and they have suggested that the Hochfelder decision be overturned 
by legislation. The report of the Metcalf subcommittee stated: 
The subcommittee believes that independent auditors of publicly owned 
corporations should be liable for their negligence to private parties who 
suffer damages as a result. 1 0 
Also, the American L a w Institute's proposal to restate the securities laws is 
expected to be presented to Congress i n the near future. The provisions of the 
A L I ' s securities code on liability seem to be based more on a study of past and 
present regulations rather than any fundamental rethinking of the auditor's role 
i n securities markets. 1 1 If Congress does take up this project, modification of 
the effect of the Hochfelder decision is likely. 
Negligence Blurs Culpability and Care 
T o compound the difficulties, the concept of negligence is being altered i n 
the courts. Negligence i n professional services has usually been defined i n terms 
of the standards or customs of the profession. T o practicing professionals, this 
would seem a reasonable basis for evaluating the adequacy of performance, both 
during the engagement and i n hindsight. Some courts, however, disregard 
professional standards i n determining liability. 
In accounting, the most notable decision disregarding professional standards 
is Herzfeld, where the court stated: 
M u c h has been said by the parties about generally accepted accounting 
principles and the proper way for an accountant to report real estate 
transactions. W e think this misses the point. O u r inquiry is properly 
focused not on whether L K H & H ' s report satisfies esoteric accounting 
norms, comprehensible only to initiate, but whether the report fairly 
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presents the true financial position . . . to the untutored eye of an 
ordinary investor. 1 2 
The Herzfeld decision has a counterpart i n the medical profession i n Helling 
v. Carey. In that case, the Supreme Court of Washington held an ophthalmologist 
negligent for fail ing to test a patient for glaucoma even though there was un-
controverted testimony that the custom was to not test patients such as the 
plaintiff because at his age the disease rarely appears. In finding the doctor 
negligent, the court indicated that the glaucoma test was harmless, reliable, and 
inexpensive; however, one commentator noted: 
None of these assumptions may be accurate. The test is not always a 
reliable indicator of the presence of glaucoma, and it may cause injury 
to the eye. A n d it is inexpensive only when viewed i n isolation. T h e 
test for glaucoma is only one of what is no doubt a large number of 
diagnostic tests which the medical profession does not administer unless 
special circumstances indicate that they should be . 1 3 
One can imagine the risks auditors would face if they were held liable for 
omitting uncustomary but inexpensive audit tests. 
The Helling v. Carey decision apparently caused considerable outrage, and 
the State of Washington overturned the ruling by legislation. Apparently, the 
prospect of lawyers and judges establishing appropriate medical practice was 
unsatisfactory. Accounting may be viewed differently. Many accounting con-
cepts, such as income, have counterparts in everyday life, and it is difficult for 
nonaccountants to understand why financial statements should be so complex. 
If professional standards are disregarded as a basis for determining liability, 
what standard is to be applied? One author speculates: 
Careful attention might well be given the view . . . that strict liability, 
even to professions, might be imposed where the recipient's reasonable 
expectations as to quality of service are not met, causing h i m detriment. 1 4 
Determining "reasonableness" i n an accounting case may be highly subjective. 
Several factors make judicial determinations of reasonableness difficult: 
(1) the evaluation of a particular defendant's conduct may require an 
unusually complex, highly technical analysis; (2) the parties may be 
in a special relationship which must be taken into account by modifying 
the duties each owes to the other; and (3) practical considerations may 
compel courts to place limits upon the extent of potential liability for 
certain types of conduct. 1 5 
Each of these factors can apply and has applied to audit engagements. 
If reasonableness becomes an unworkable standard, it too may be eliminated. 
One author states: 
Eventually, of course, all references to reasonableness may be removed 
from tort law, and liability may be strictly imposed merely on the basis 
of causation, with no fault standard, no required deviation from a 
n o r m . 1 6 
I 'm sure he d id not intend to imply that all reasonableness would be removed 
from tort law, but that is the inference of another observer: 
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W e are rapidly approaching the day when liability w i l l be determined 
routinely on a case by case, "under all the circumstances" basis, wi th 
decision makers (other juries) guided only by the broadest of general 
principles. W h e n that day arrives, the retreat from the rules of law 
w i l l be complete, principled decision w i l l have been replaced with de-
cision by w h i m , and the common law of negligence w i l l have been de-
generated into an unjustifiably inefficient, thinly disguised lottery. 1 7 
W h e n the chaos of such a judicial system has become apparent, nonjudicial 
solutions w i l l have to be considered. That k i n d of situation has given us no-fault 
auto insurance, which seems unsatisfactory to just about everyone. Similar 
solutions have been proposed for other types of malpractice liability. 
Charting a Course against the Current 
I do not mean to project a dismal or catastrophic view of the future of legal 
liability. The accounting profession has survived past changes and w i l l survive 
future changes even though litigation may become more vexatious and torts 
become more tortuous. 
If the profession is not to be swept away with the current change in legal 
liability, perhaps we should worry less about what liability has been or w i l l be 
and more about what it should be. 
Although the court i n Hochfelder did not address the question of whether 
a reckless disregard of the truth constitutes intentional conduct, it does not 
seem unreasonable that independent auditors should be held liable to third 
parties for such recklessness. 
Accountants who gullibly accept transparently fishy explanations from 
their clients of an obviously suspicious transaction are liable under 
10b-5, no matter what their mental state. 1 8 
Current research on the effect of information on the securities markets seems 
to indicate that for the general investor, reliance on the financial statements may 
not be a relevant prerequisite to recovery. According to one's interpretation, 
financial statements are not, cannot, or should not be used in any direct way 
i n making investment decisions. However, based on an analysis of the efficient 
market hypothesis, Anderson concludes that an auditor perhaps should be liable 
to a narrow class of investors. 1 9 
The extent to which the auditor's liability has developed on a case-by-case 
basis is indicative of the lack of a clear conception in the law of the auditor's 
responsibilities. Auditors and the public would benefit i f more specific standards 
of conduct were established before the fact. Independent auditors need some 
confidence that the appropriateness of their conduct can be measured in advance 
of making difficult audit judgments. 
What is needed is a thorough reexamination of the role and responsibilities 
of professionals under the securities laws. First, the role of experts should be 
examined more closely. Under the securities laws, five groups are subject to 
liability: (1) issuers, (2) directors, (3) corporate executives, (4) experts, and 
(5) underwriters. A n expert is anyone whose profession gives authority to a 
statement made by h i m . However, as the administration of the securities laws 
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has developed, the independent auditor and, to a much lesser extent, the securities 
lawyer have been the experts subjected to liability. Today, the security analyst, 
the portfolio manager, and the investment advisor play as significant a role i n 
the securities markets as the independent auditor and the securities lawyer, but 
this role remains largely unrecognized i n the established framework for allocating 
liability. 
Also desirable would be recognition by securities laws of the need for a 
rational connection between the fault of an expert and recoverable losses. This 
subject has been approached simplistically as a choice between requiring an i n -
vestor to prove reliance on an expert's work and eliminating the reliance require-
ment because the expert's work is presumably reflected i n the market price. 
This dichotomy ignores the social effect of removing all the burden from the 
investor of demonstrating a l ink between market price and the expert's work. 
The result is that experts, primarily independent auditors, have sometimes been 
cast as insurers against the investment risk of loss. 
Nearly any major securities loss opens the auditor's performance to second 
guessing and hindsight. Thus, before Hochfelder, plaintiff's counsel had only 
to create a material issue of fact as to an omission or a statement that turned out, 
with hindsight, to have been imprecise to subject an independent auditor to 
potential liability. 
Securities are not the same as products intended for immediate consumption. 
Securities are purchased to be held at risk with the expectation of future gain, 
but the potential of future loss. A system that causes experts to reimburse losses 
but not share i n any gain is unreasonable unless the expert's culpability i n the 
loss is clearly demonstrated. A negligence standard that amounts to strict liability 
for professional services, inappropriately makes the auditor an insurer of in-
vestment risk. 
Further, the legislative pressure for a negligence standard makes develop-
ment of an equitable alternative imperative. What I suggest is that culpability 
be measured by a recklessness standard and that performance be measured by 
professional standards. T o be acceptable, this framework would require stringent 
adherence to the public interest in the development of standards. Professional 
standards should be subjected to a rigorous "reasonableness" test in the develop-
ment process rather than subjecting performance to such a test with hindsight 
and i n disregard of professional standards. 
Standards—Who's i n Charge Anyway? 
What can the accounting profession do if other courts go along wi th the 
thinking of the Herzfeld decision and disregard professional standards i n favor 
of a reasonableness approach? 
One thing that can be done is to keep a watchful eye on court decisions 
and adapt professional standards accordingly. For example, the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities recommended that the auditor evaluate the "cumulative 
effect of management's judgment i n the presentation of financial statements." 
The Commission stated: 
This is the only position consistent with the views expressed by regu-
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latory agencies and the courts that auditors have an obligation to go 
beyond determining technical compliance with specific accounting 
principles and to evaluate the overall presentation of earnings and 
financial position in the financial statements. 2 0 
The responsiveness of professional standards to litigation goes back at least to 
the first A I C P A auditing pronouncement S A P N o . 1 (October 1939), " E x -
tensions of A u d i t i n g Procedure," which resulted from the McKesson & Robbins 
case. Being in the position of playing catch-up is not, however, satisfactory. 
Another possibility which has been discussed much in certain circles is to 
have the government set standards. Some, including Representative Moss, have 
argued that the S E C should directly set accounting and auditing standards. The 
reasoning behind this position is that the S E C was given authority to set 
standards by the securities acts, and that authority should be exercised. Perhaps 
the courts would be less inclined to find fault wi th federal regulations than w i t h 
professional standards. However, regulations have several disadvantages com-
pared to professional standards. Searching for loopholes is unfortunately a 
practice that is fostered by detailed regulation. For this reason, and several 
others, professions have traditionally been expected to set their own standards. 
This subject has been considered at length by the Commission on Auditors ' 
Responsibilities and I won't repeat that discussion here except to note the large 
role already played by the S E C i n standard setting. 
The S E C has been far from idle i n the area of accounting and auditing 
standards. It has many and none-too-subtle ways of communicating its positions 
to the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the A u d i t i n g Standards Ex-
ecutive Committee. The report of the Commission on Auditors ' Responsibilities 
chronicles the actions by the S E C i n the development of auditing standards on 
the review of interim information. 2 1 More recently, the SEC's disapproval 
stopped short the proposal to eliminate the auditor's qualified opinion on 
uncertainties. 
The S E C has been adept at handling political pressure and exercising 
selectivity in directing the setting of accounting and auditing standards. A t the 
moment, however, the S E C is facing a serious test wi th the accounting standards 
on o i l and gas. It has held hearings to determine if the F A S B has made the 
correct choice from among alternative accounting principles. The oi l and gas 
standards have also sparked a new-found interest i n accounting standards by the 
Department of Energy, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Justice Depart-
ment. There is the danger that political pressure may cause the S E C or Congress 
to endorse alternative accounting principles for similar circumstances. A s un-
desirable as that would be from the standpoint of improving accounting 
standards, it still amounts to no more than selective overriding of the standard 
setting process for accounting and not a takeover. 
However, there is a much greater danger that the auditing standard setting 
process w i l l be swept up in a more general takeover of the regulation of auditing 
practice. 
Unbridled Regulation 
Prospects for the regulation of the public accounting profession are fluid 
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at the moment. Representative Moss has indicated he may introduce legislation 
i n this Congress, but it is uncertain how much support such a measure would 
have. Pressure has been placed on the S E C to increase its oversight of the ac-
counting profession, and the Commission w i l l be reporting to Congress this July 
on the extent of the A I C P A ' s progress in self-regulation. 
Recently, Senator Eagleton sent a questionnaire to each of the national 
accounting firms, the C A S B , the F A S B , the A I C P A , and the S E C . Senator 
Eagleton is the chairman of the subcommittee that has assumed the responsi-
bilities of Senator Metcalf's subcommittee since his untimely death. The re-
quest to the A I C P A has over fifty questions on the A I C P A ' s progress on the 
recommendations made by the Metcalf subcommittee. 
Fol lowing the SEC's report i n July, new hearings may be held i n both 
houses of Congress to evaluate the need for federal legislation to regulate the 
accounting profession. 
Consumers, for whose benefit such regulation is proposed, are ill-defined. 
As far as the effect of accounting data is concerned, we are all consumers. Since 
the consumer movement has no well developed goals, no unified organization, 
and no program of action, future developments may depend largely on historical 
accident. If another Penn Central or Equity Funding surfaces, support for 
federal regulation could crystallize quickly. 
James Q . Wilson described several scenarios by which regulation is initiated. 
It is interesting to compare his description of the process to recent events af-
fecting the accounting profession. Wilson offers the following description of 
the process when the benefits of regulation are diffuse and the costs of regula-
tion are relatively concentrated, which seems to be the relevant reference for 
regulation of the accounting profession: 
Regulatory proposals emerging from this process are likely to have 
certain distinctive features. First, i n order to ensure vital publicity and 
develop political momentum in the competition for attention i n and 
around Congress, the bills w i l l focus attention on an " e v i l , " personified 
if possible i n a corporation, industry, or victim. Second the proposal 
w i l l be "strong"—that is, there w i l l be little incentive i n the develop-
mental process to accommodate conflicting interests and thus little in -
centive to find a politically acceptable formula which al l affected parties 
can live wi th . ( T o compromise the proposal would be to sacrifice the 
capacity of the bil l to mobilize support by its moralistic appeal.) T h i r d , 
though few substantive bargains w i l l be struck, many procedural ones 
w i l l , especially ones that recognize the central structural fact of the 
American Congress—namely, that it is a federal institution based on 
state and district representation. Concessions w i l l often be made to 
recognize existing state programs or to provide incentives for states to 
develop new programs. Finally, the proposed solutions to the prob-
lematic business practice w i l l be shaped as much by the political process 
by which the proposal is generated as by an analysis of the problem 
itself. 2 2 
The first step has happened. The shortcomings of independent auditors 
have been chronicled i n recent Congressional hearings and reports. Emphasis 
has been placed on a few spectacular corporate failures and the more widespread 
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illegal payments problem. Little attention has been given to the cost effectiveness 
of audits extensive enough to seriously reduce these problems. Bob Cratchitt has 
become M r . Scrooge. 
It is doubtful that many members of Congress are now greatly concerned 
about the regulation of the accounting profession. W h e n the securities acts were 
enacted i n 1933 and 1934, Congress showed little familiarity wi th and less interest 
i n the profession. This condition has carried over somewhat into the present. 
For example, consider this exchange i n the House of Representatives concerning 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: 
Rep. 1: W i l l the gentleman please explain briefly the changes that the 
Senate suggested. 
Rep. 2: The Senate added a provision which would have required 
U.S . corporations which file wi th the S E C to keep accurate 
books and records, and so forth, and we accepted that. W e 
made two minor changes that had to go with it, that had to 
satisfy the accountants. There was some question about some 
of the things that they were perturbed about. W e removed 
those and the section that had to do with that. Then we took 
section 2 of the Senate b i l l , the complete section, which ex-
panded the disclosure requirements presently applicable to 
investors i n equity securities, particularly as those require-
ments affect the disclosure of foreign investments in the United 
States. Those are the principal changes. 
Rep. 1: I thank the gentleman. 2 3 
Federal regulation of the accounting profession might have appeal to some 
auditors. For example, i n the extreme case of a corps of federal auditors, some 
practicing auditors might be attracted by less overtime, better pensions, and 
increased job security. Also, as a federal employee, an auditor would generally 
be immune to litigation. 
Perhaps the greater danger is not that auditors would suffer under federal 
regulation, but that auditors might come to like and depend on regulation. 
Such an occurrence is not unheard of; i t has happened to varying extents i n the 
trucking industry, television broadcasting, and the merchant marine. It is 
sometimes hard to tell who is regulating whom. 
Recently there has been considerable discussion concerning what some see 
as a trend toward two tiers in the profession—firms with S E C registered clients 
and firms without S E C registered clients. If there is such a trend, ft is because 
of the more extensive regulation of S E C registrants. This arises both from 
direct regulation by the S E C and from pressure on the profession to establish 
more stringent standards suitable for S E C registrants. Federal regulation of the 
profession could exacerbate this trend, and more extensive regulations for S E C 
registrants have a habit of carrying over to audits of private companies. One 
author describes the effects of increasing regulation on the availability of services: 
A related consequence of business " reform" is the elimination of poor 
man's goods. The second-hand items, the economy models, the stripped-
down items are almost always the ones which turn out to be unsafe 
(or at least uninspected), or which fall short of some arbitrary standard 
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of this or that costly desideratum. The Model T and the Volkswagen 
fall under suspicion, but the market is made safe for Cadillacs, armored 
cars, and Sherman tanks . 2 4 
This danger has been recognized i n discussions of federal regulation of 
the accounting profession, but there are no substantive guarantees that federal 
regulation w i l l not inflict needless costs on smaller C P A firms and their clients. 
However, it is well to remember Wilson's analysis that the legislative solu-
tion w i l l be shaped as much by the political process as by an analysis of the 
problem to be resolved. The introduction to the report of the Metcalf subcom-
mittee suggests the criteria against which the need for legislation w i l l be tested. 
There are two basic tenets i n today's environment that seem necessary 
for government and business leaders to follow if they are to regain 
public confidence. The first is avoidance of real or apparent conflicts 
of interest i n the performance of their duties. The second is a policy of 
openness which permits the public to satisfy itself that leaders i n our 
society are acting properly. Government officials have taken substantial 
steps to implement these two basic tenets. Business leaders are moving 
i n that direction, and it is i n this light that independent auditors 
w i l l be judged. 2 5 
For the accounting profession these two tenets can be translated into the 
following tests. 
• Reinforce the independence of the audit function by imposing mean-
ingful restrictions on the scope of management services and by re-
structuring the relationship of auditors and managements by inter-
posing an independent audit committee. 
• Improving the setting of professional standards and the enforcement 
of those standards by opening the process to public scrutiny and by 
increasing responsiveness to the public interest. 
Efforts are being made by the accounting profession to achieve these goals, but 
the evaluation of progress is clearly in the political arena. 
W e l l , Where A r e We Going? 
M y mission was to provide an answer to H o w a r d Stettler's searching ques-
t ion: Has the accounting profession lost control of its destiny? I took this to 
mean: Where is the accounting profession going and who is i n charge of the 
trip? M y answer focuses on three primary indicators of the status of the ac-
counting profession: 
• The legal liability of independent auditors. 
• The authority to set professional standards. 
• The extent of federal regulation of the accounting profession. 
A n y one of these indicators would require more than a short paper for thorough 
analysis. However, I hope my analysis is sufficient to point to an answer to the 
basic question. 
The accounting profession does not control its status i n any of the three 
areas. Control is shared with the courts, the S E C , Congress, and the undercurrent 
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of consumerism i n society. Thus, the ability of the accounting profession to 
influence its destination i n all three areas depends on its ability to convince those 
with whom it shares control that it can be trusted to act in the public interest. 
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